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ABSTRACT

This thesis aims to investigate the relationship between The American Agriculture
Movement (AAM) and group theory, with a focus on AAM’s usage of Tractorcade as a tool to
promote policy change. Gathering data through a myriad of sources - including existing
literature, oral histories, newspaper articles, documents, and journal entires - this thesis analyzes
AAM’s Tractorcade demonstration as a social movement aimed at influencing policy change.
Utilizing Charles Tilly’s worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment (WUNC) social movement
framework, we find that although AAM employed strong unity and numbers, they failed in
displaying substantial worthiness or commitment, ultimately leading to a lack of policy change.
These findings can be further understood through group theory, which describes that strong
relationships between interest groups and policy makers, as well as long-term interaction, are
vital to the policy change process. In both of these areas AAM fell short in the long run.

Keywords: American Agriculture Movement, Tractorcade, Group Theory, Agriculture
Policy, Social Movement, Washington, D.C.
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Introduction
“None of us realized what we were getting into. And none of us realized how hard it
would be. Spirits were high and adrenalin was flowing. You know, we were going to change the
world,” said Majorie Scheufler of Kansas, remembering the attitudes leading up to the
Tractorcade (“Tractorcade Interviewees”, 2012).
Among agriculture and food policy examined and studied over the past few decades,
one piece of the puzzle is often overlooked: The American Agriculture Movement (AAM).
Although quite brief in the grand scheme of things, this movement was highly influential in the
1970s and early 1980s as far as representing the specific interests of farmers across the country.
Some of those specifically involved believe the movement was responsible for saving a vast
number of small farms across America and shaping future farm policy to help promote the
success of local farmers.
In February 1979, thousands of tractors lined Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington,
D.C. with one goal in mind: policy change. Farmers from across the country rolled into the
nation’s Capitol with hopes of pushing their interests on a narrow-minded Congress. This
unprecedented demonstration would come to be known as the 1979 Tractorcade. Inflation, low
prices, and high costs caused intense suffering for American farmers in the years preceding the
Tractorcade. Along with policy makers and political officials, the unique demonstration caught
the attention of the American people as lines of tractors passed through small towns across
America. The National Mall became the temporary home for these farmers and their daunting
tractors for much longer than expected. This demonstration is known as the American
Agriculture Movement’s Tractorcade.
!8

The movement blocked traffic and caused disruption to the daily lives of D.C.
residents, but the mission for farmers was steadfast. They traveled thousands of miles, moving at
less than twenty miles per hour with high hopes for change, so they stayed for weeks with the
last tractors finally departing D.C. in June. Unsurprisingly, the farmers’ agenda did not manifest
from thin air. The group’s mission was bound by a common struggle that eventually fostered into
a large-scale network called the American Agriculture Movement. In 1977, out of Campo,
Colorado, a group of farmers began expressing their discontent with current agriculture policy.
The legislation of the time was inefficient for agriculture producers and left farmers and their
families economically depressed. At the onset of this movement, local AAM offices began
popping up across the country, expanding the mission of the movement from local to national.
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Chapter 1: Policy Background
In 1973, an omnibus farm bill was enacted through the Agriculture and Consumer
Protection Act. With this bill, President Richard Nixon and Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz
hoped to strengthen market profits for farmers. When the bill was signed into action on August
10, 1973, President Nixon said, “the effect of this bill is to set up a new system of price
guarantees for American farmers,” (West et al., 1974, p. 13). At this point in time, high demand
for wheat and American goods alongside high inflation rates resulted in high commodity prices.
This set the stage for the new commodity price targets and movement away from price parity in
the 1973 Farm Bill. A major motive for these legislative changes was in order to increase
agriculture exports and balance trade by expanding global markets (West et al., 1974, p.
313-328). Price parity was particularly important for farmers because it guaranteed fair prices on
farm products and labor while still offering farmers the means for a comfortable livelihood.
As the agri-business climate changed over the next five years, the measures enacted
within the 1973 Farm Bill were no longer as substantive in protecting farmers. Some of these
changes include trends in supply and demand and slowed export rates in conjunction with an
increasing United States population rate. These economic shifts induced low prices because
commodity supply had increased without a significant growth in demand from global markets
(West et al., 1974, pp. 313-328). Congress attempted to counteract these unforeseen economic
realities in 1975 with H.R. 4296, “A bill to adjust target prices, loan and purchase levels on the
1975 crops of upland cotton, corn, wheat and soybeans, to provide price support for milk at 85
percent of parity with quarterly adjustments for the period ending March 31,
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1976,” (Congress.gov, n.d.). Ultimately, this bill was vetoed by President Gerald Ford. Farmers
were hoping for these discrepancies to be further corrected in the upcoming 1977 Farm Bill.
The 1977 Farm Bill is also known as the Food and Agriculture Act of 1977.
Unintentionally, this bill made it practically impossible for farmers to produce for profit, making
it more and more difficult to keep family farms in operation across the country. The major issue
farmers wanted addressed in 1977 was price parity: the high costs farmers incurred relative to the
price consumers paid for food products. The 1977 Farm Bill focused on food supply levels and
exports, including policy such as income boundaries, price support floors, and production
controls (Spitze, 1978, pp. 225-235). The bill aimed to support both producers and consumers,
but the balance leaned in favor of consumers, leaving farmers more economically burdened than
before the legislation was signed into law.
The growing usage of omnibus legislation for farm policy in the 1970s simultaneously
led to the increased usage of economists to advise the writing of bills. This resulted in
alternatives that addressed issues which were more focused on economic trends and consumption
statistics, along with reliance on balanced future supply and demand. In effect, the economics of
agriculture and food trends outweighed the actual interests of farmers (West et al., 1974, p.
313-328). Therefore, as Congress continued to pass legislation that ignored what farmers needed
in order to promote productivity and profit, rural economic markets worsened across the country.
As AAM’s website, aaminc.org, points out, “every time a farmer produced and sold a
commodity, he or she went a little further in debt and lost a little more equity in their land and
equipment.” These circumstances were leading to widespread loss of profit and functionality in
small localities. If policy officials failed to protect local farming operations, entire communities
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in rural America - that rely wholly on the money gained through agriculture - would lose their
livelihood along with their income.
The American Agriculture Movement started in 1977 as a reactionary measure to the
Farm Bill, a piece of legislation that continuously overshadowed and ignored the true wants and
needs of American farmers. Even though farmers had been increasingly frustrated with farm
policy for years, the 1977 legislation was the last straw, opening up the gates for farmers to start
their own grassroots campaign. Farmers came to the realization they could no longer rely on
lobbyists and public officials to speak on their behalf; they needed to do it themselves. The
American Agriculture Movement’s primary goal from the beginning was to perform a crop
production strike starting December 17, 1977 if their requests were not met by officials in
Washington, D.C. before that date. However, this goal eventually shifted toward putting on a
demonstration.
This thesis will examine the relationship between group theory and the American
Agriculture Movement’s attempt at influencing policy change, with Tractorcade as its main
catalyst. The primary research question for this exploration is: How can the relationship between
group theory and the American Agriculture Movement explain the organization’s attempt at
influencing policy change through the usage of Tractorcade? Further investigating the
relationship between group theory and AAM will help explore how certain interest groups
attempt to influence policy makers and legislation in their favor. Public policy is often the
equilibrium found, resulting from group struggle so, through the lens of group theory, I can trace
AAM’s development (Anyebe, 2018, p. 10). Moreover, using Charles Tilly’s social movement
framework, I will examine the 1979 Tractorcade protest using four criteria: worthiness, unity,
!12

numbers, and commitment. Tractorcade is vitally important to the overall outcomes of AAM’s
mission, as it acted as the most pivotal catalyst for the movements’ overall strategy.
Chapter 2 will provide the reader a foundation of group theory. Chapter 3 will present
the social movement framework and methodology approach utilized in this thesis. Chapter 4 will
highlight the findings excavated using the social movement framework and group theory to
understand Tractorcade. Chapter 5 will provide a discussion regarding Tractorcade’s impact on
the AAM strategic goals and overall outcomes. Finally, chapter 6 will highlight limitations,
broader perspectives and provide a conclusion.
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Chapter 2: Group Theory
This analysis will approach the American Agriculture Movement (AAM) from the
perspective of group theory. In this case, group theory can be defined by the influence of an
organized group with a common political interest pushing for policy change. More specifically,
influence can be defined as a “behavior outcome [reflecting] a change that would not have been
there without the efforts of the influencer” (Smith, 1979, p. 234). As groups influence political
outcomes, one of the most important variables is the relationship between group actors and
legislative actors. Adam Anyebe (2012) in his overview of approaches to public policy states that
“public policy is the equilibrium reached in this group struggle at any given moment, and it
represents a balance which the contending factions or groups constantly strive to win in their
favour” (p. 12). Kraft and Furlong in Public Policy agree that the continuous struggle for balance
between groups results in policy alternatives (2020). Group theory suggests that interest groups
and their agenda pushing is vital to the legislative process. The influencing group in discussion
of this thesis is organized farmers from across the United States asking elected officials for fiscal
policy improvement for farmers, specifically small family farms.
The introduction of group theory and the influence of interest groups on politics can be
traced back to literature originating in 1788, when The Federalist Papers by Alexander
Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay were published. Group interest is embedded within the
United States democracy. Regarding the American Agriculture Movement, the struggle was
between a few powerful players - the political elite - and the interests of the minority group
asking for change. This common relation of group theory to the analogy of a larger struggle was
introduced in The Federalists Papers’ idea of factions - the modern day’s equivalent of interest
!14

groups (Tichenor & Harris, 2005). This supports how important group theory and interest group
influence has been on American politics since the foundation of the United States.
At the beginning of government formation, leaders saw these factions as problematic
and representing “assertive selfishness” (Tichenor & Harris, 2005, p. 264). However, over time
these attitudes have changed and government leaders have realized that interest groups are one of
the largest political influencers and a pivotal tool in representation of the people’s wants. Without
interest groups, government entities and citizens would likely be starkly disconnected. Interest
groups allow representatives and constituents to be linked by a struggle for change. Interest
groups are unique in that they do not have to move through the platform of political parties in
order to have their agenda heard by government leaders. Furthermore, “it is clearly more
effective for groups to interact directly with governmental administrators and congressional
overseers than to have their preferences filtered through the parties, where policy outcomes are
the product of compromise” (Tichenor, 2005, p. 265). Without successful interest groups, policy
would likely reflect elite interests over the interests of the people they represent.
Today, interest groups are found in a myriad of forms and sizes, all reflecting a vast
range of goals. Interest groups can begin as small as local, grassroots movements - much like the
American Agriculture Movement. These types of movements seek concentrated, local policy
change that directly affect day to day life. Interest groups can also become as large and
influential as the American Medical Association, which represents the ideals of America’s
doctors. Interest groups can cover public interests, private interests, labor interests, and most
commonly - business and trade interests. Group theory and the formation of these interest groups
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supports the constant interaction of these groups with policy makers in order to push legislation
through Congress.
Group theorists find that interest groups are able to gain more leverage on their agenda
if the group works to push their interests for an extended period of time. This can be explained
by group theory’s relationship with the “iron triangle.” The iron triangle is the relationship shared
between interest groups, bureaucratic agencies, and congressional committees. Those groups
who can capitalize within this iron triangle are most likely to have their interests represented in
government policy and legislation (Tichenor, 2005, p. 263). In their research, Kraft and Furlong
refer to the iron triangle as an advocacy coalition, where different actors pursue policy outcomes
together over time (2020). The power of the iron triangle, or advocacy coalition, demonstrates
how interest groups that are equipped with money are able to professionally represent themselves
and are more likely to penetrate the iron triangle, which leads to having their voices heard by
policy makers.
In recent times, theorists have begun to move away from “iron triangles” and toward
“issue networks.” Issue networks are more general and involve the interaction among competing
interest groups, individuals, and agencies. Issue networks attempt to encompass all of the areas
in which policy struggle can be had over competing interests, specific individuals, and groups
(Tichenor, 2005, p. 263). Policy is what results from these struggles.
The usage of iron triangles and issue networks make sense under the pluralistic
approach to politics in the United States. Pluralism in America is known as the “compromise of
interests, pressure groups, and sections” (Drucker, 1948, p. 412). Pluralism, and this struggle
between interest groups, is a uniquely American process and serves as the basic foundation of
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how our government operates. All elected officials, agencies, interest groups, institutions, and
governmental systems are tied together under the structure of American pluralism. Pluralism can
be seen as perfect competition between these groups, struggling and negotiating until some type
of equilibrium is reached (Drucker, 1948). Pluralism and group theory go hand in hand, as
groups attempt to influence elected officials in government to represent their interests in the form
of policy changes and new legislation.
With group theory in practice, interest group pressures are common and are typically
successful within United States policy. Looking at historical trends, our political system is highly
reactive to group demands, as interest groups act as the messenger between “public factions and
political decision-makers” (Grossman, 2006, p. 121). When attempting to break down the
success of individual interest groups, many different characteristics can affect the outcomes on
the political playing field including good leadership (Garceau, 1958), plentiful resources
(Anyebe, 2018), a positive reputation with decision makers, and continued interaction with
policy makers for extended periods of time (Smith, 1979).
Firstly, good leadership is an ultimate factor influencing the establishment and success of
a group pushing for policy change. Strong leaders are necessary in order to bind the group and
group’s interests together from the beginning. Without a leader, a group will most likely fail to
gain the momentum needed to push political agendas and drive change. In order for groups to
make actual political change, they must mobilize the group’s agenda toward a specific goal.
Additionally, policy officials must be convinced to recognize and validate the group’s wants and
needs to begin the formulation of legislation. If a strong leader is not present to promote a policy
vision, a consensus is unlikely to be met, making the possible success of the group slim.
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In addition to good leadership, having abundant resources to help promote the group’s
interests simplifies the policy advocacy process. As Anyebe (2018) states, “politics involves a lot
of expenditure,” and those groups which have the means to spend are able to push their demand
to the top of the agenda (p. 11). Having wealth within the group provides an ample amount of
assets to help share and negotiate the group’s interest at the national level.
Another important indicator of whether or not a group will be successful in influencing
political change is related to the group's reputation with policy makers. If a group’s overall
reputation is not positively accepted by legislators, it will prove difficult for their interests to
become convincing to policy makers (Smith, 1979, p. 235). Simply, “the power of lobby is often
complemented by the degree of visibility of the lobbyist. Persons that are well known and
respected in society could easily influence decision makers to support their ideas in
parliament” (Anyebe, 2018, p. 12). Group theory shows that interest groups need the support of
important policy makers in order for legislation to pass successfully. In fact, “without their
support, the group advocating change wins only 30 percent of the time” (Smith, 1979, p. 235).
The more personal contact a particular group or its individual members have with legislators, the
more likely their interests will be represented (Smith, 1979, p. 236). The better policy makers
know individual representatives of an issue, the more likely they are to be persuaded to act in the
group’s favor. Furthermore, the more frequent positive interactions that occur between interest
groups and legislators will help contribute to building the positive rapport necessary for policy
change. If groups are able to interact with legislators on a consistent basis, those policy makers
are more likely to support their cause.
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There are many limitations to group theory and its influence on policy change. One of the
largest limitations of group theory is the size of the group. Large groups often have an easier
time getting the attention of the people, the media, and therefore legislators. Large groups also
usually have access to funding and resources. Therefore, they can pay professionals to lobby on
behalf of their interests. On the other hand, if a group is too large, the agenda may not be as
coherent, which can lead the group off track. As for smaller groups, their pursuit of change may
not be as recognizable, but their interests are often more concentrated and easily understood by
policy makers. Group theory shows how the success of an interest group is dependent on the
relationship between many varying factors of the group, its members, its goals, and the
surrounding environment.
Since the late 1800s and early 1900s, group theory has always been closely tied to
agricultural interests on both the local and national levels. In the beginning, gaining the attention
of policy actors in Washington, D.C. was difficult to accomplish by outsider groups such as
farmers. Therefore, farm groups often resorted to violence - both in organized and unorganized
manners - when their petitioning practices proved unsuccessful. For example, in the 1930s, a
group called the Farm Holiday blocked highways into farmer’s markets, ruined farm products,
and let cattle loose with the intention of reducing the available farm supply and therefore
increasing prices (Ganzel, 2003). So, in place of violence, lobbying efforts increased as
individuals and small groups began to use advocacy tactics to influence the party in power.
Over time, alliances and coalitions began to represent the interests of farmers on a
larger scale such as the farmer-labor alliance known as the Farmers’ Union. In the 1900s, many
of the rising organizations of the time sought to fight monopolization by corporate farms and
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global trade. Pressure by these organizations in the early 1900s resulted in the formulation of the
Farm Bureau, showing just how much group efforts by agri-business influenced the decisions of
policy makers of the time (Mooney & Majka, 1995). These changes also resulted in the
popularity of lobbying as a means of pushing the agriculture agenda on behalf of the farmers’
interests. However, this trend was confronted as economic decline ensued in the following years.
Instead, farmers turned to protests, grassroots action, and holding tactics - usually including
violence or force - in order to pursue policy change. These facts are especially relevant as the
proportion of American farmers declined over the course of the 1900s.
Understanding the relationship between the American Agriculture Movement and
group theory provides a foundation to develop a greater understanding of Tractorcade’s place
within AAM’s overall attempt at influencing policy change. The farmers that founded, organized,
and became members of AAM were not professional lobbyists, government agency employees,
or committee members. Those who participated in the Tractorcade were everyday farmers,
working to put food on the table and support themselves and their families. Despite whether or
not the movement was successful in the long run, the mere ability of these farmers to come
together and create a movement out of the most rural corners of this nation deserves to be
recognized. These were not commercial factory farming executives. These farmers desperately
needed change in order to keep their farms afloat - AAM’s story displays the original nature of
group theory.
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Chapter 3: Methodology
In William Gamson’s renowned Strategy of Social Protest, he defines a social protest
group “as an excluded group seeking the mobilization of an immobilized constituency against an
antagonist [lying] outside of its constituency” (Frey et al., 1992, p. 368). To take a deeper look
into the effects of protests, this thesis will use the following framework in order to analyze the
American Agriculture Movement’s Tractorcade demonstration in the winter of 1979. The four
criteria which make up the framework include: worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment,
also known as WUNC.
Charles Tilly, American sociologist and political scientist, coined the term WUNC
starting in 1994. WUNC is an acronym for four terms which Tilly believes can be used to
determine the extent to which policy makers are likely to respond to a protest’s agenda. Wouters
and Walgrave (2017) sought to test values of salience, position, and intended action by policy
makers under the influence of a protest. Their study would test how the criteria within the
WUNC framework affected each of the three variables in elected representatives.
Worthiness is related to the movement’s overall reputation and the actions of protestors
themselves. Protestors who behave in a calm, peaceful manner are more likely to be respected by
legislators, therefore are more likely to persuade opinions in their favor. To representatives,
demonstrations which carry themselves in a professional manner are more likely to be
“deserving” of legislators' attention and action. Also under worthiness, it is the responsibility of
the movement to prove to policy makers that the people they are representing on behalf of the
protest deserve to be listened to and deserve to have their interests fought for. Worthiness should
also inform policy makers of where the protestors are coming from and whose interests they are
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representing. Wouters and Walgrave (2017) supported in their study that worthiness does have a
significant effect on the opinions of policy makers, even despite the fact that representative’s
opinions should be grounded in their party’s position. Specifically, protests that demonstrated
worthiness fostered “sympathy and goodwill” within representatives (Wouters & Walgrave,
2017, p. 374).
Wouters and Walgrave (2017) touch on how Tilly states that, “movements [should]
sacrifice the advantages of violent action and choose to behave non-violently to gain recognition
as respectable players who should be listened to” (p. 367). Tilly’s stance on the success of
nonviolent protests comes in contrast with the work done by Gamson’s social protest framework,
which “emphasized the advantages of disruptive strategies” (Wouters & Walgrave, 2017, p. 367).
Tilly’s framework shows that when violence takes place within social protests that are seeking
policy change in their favor, it can often lead to “marginalization and even criminalization of
protestors,” lessening the likelihood of representatives to respond to the demonstration’s wishes
(Wouters & Walgrave, 2017, p. 367).
Unity can be defined as the extent to which the message is shared among protestors
and movement participants. Wouters and Walgrave (2017) elaborate on Tilly’s interpretation of
this characteristic by adding that this criteria can be conveyed through physical gestures
including but not limited to “applauding, chanting, walking together” as well as uniform
symbols, flags, colors (p. 367). It is obvious here that if a protest’s message is clear and concise,
it is easier for representatives to understand, and therefore act on, the group’s wants. If a group’s
message is difficult to interpret, it is likely that policy makers will not bother attempting to
understand the changes the protest is seeking. Additionally, Wouters and Walgrave (2017) claim
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that a unified message can also attest to the coherence of the group as a whole. This adds to
politicians’ beliefs that the group is organized and concentrated; which can in turn vouch for the
group's worthiness. Politicians often view highly organized groups as those which are easier to
negotiate and make a deal with. Unity also proved to be an influential factor on the beliefs of
representatives within the study, showing that there were negative attitudes associated with
demonstrations that could not convey a clear, cohesive message (Wouters & Walgrave, 2017, p.
374).
The next piece of criteria within the WUNC framework is numbers. Simply, this
component deals with the amount of participants in a protest group. Oftentimes, protest strength
is inherently viewed by outsiders by the sheer number of people participating. Furthermore, the
larger number of people a representative feels as though they are appealing to by supporting a
protest, the more likely they are to take action on behalf of the group. Protests often only include
a small portion of the people of which the group is representing; therefore, a large turnout shows
the group as a whole is vast (Wouters & Walgrave, 2017, p. 368). Luckily, protest size is easy for
representatives to notice and act upon. Unsurprisingly, high numbers of participants lead to
effects on all three beliefs in the Wouters and Walgrave (2017) WUNC study (p. 374).
Finally, the last criteria of Tilly’s WUNC framework is commitment. Specifically,
“committed protestors convince elected representatives that the activity is not simply a fad but
that dissatisfaction is deeply rooted” (Wouters & Walgrave, 2017, p. 368). Committed protest
participants will undoubtedly change their behavior in a way that is unsatisfactory to politicians
if their demands are not met. This encourages policy makers to take action on the group’s behalf
in order to avoid such consequences. Also, the more committed a protest is to their goals, the
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more likely they are to take drastic measures in pursuit of their goals. Commitment can usually
act as a parallel to how salient an issue is to the protesting group. However, protestors who may
in fact be extremely committed to their cause may not have the ability to accurately convey their
position to policy makers (p. 375). Therefore, it can be difficult for commitment in and of itself
to affect representatives’ beliefs or attitudes despite the fact that it is important to the protest’s
success as a whole. Commitment is also positively correlated to the extent of time a group
continues to seek action by policy makers on behalf of their goals.
In general, Tilly’s WUNC framework contests that protests which can successfully and
consistently demonstrate worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment, are more likely to
succeed in gaining positive outcomes from policy makers. In the Wouters and Walgrave (2017)
study, the research focused specifically on representatives’ opinions regarding the protest.
Opinions are important when considering social movements because without elected
representatives that hold positive opinions of a certain protest, it is virtually impossible for that
group to make their desired changes on the political scale.
As far as the study done by Wouter and Walgrave (2017) on Tilly’s WUNC framework,
the study was able to conclude that “the aggregate effect of all WUNC elements together is quite
substantial” (p. 375). Therefore, a protest that is able to capitalize on all four of the WUNC
factors, will become much more effective in swaying the opinions of policy makers in their
favor. Due to the fact that support of policy makers often relies on the representative’s initial
stance on the issue being protested, Wouters and Walgrave believe that protests acting on newer
issues are more likely to positively persuade officials’ opinions. However, protests do stand as a
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strong option when attempting to influence, persuade, or even change elected officials'
predispositions.
Tilly believes “WUNC seems to mobilize the most basic democratic responsiveness
among representatives” (Wouters & Walgrave, 2017, p. 376). It is important to look at how
protests can influence a policy official's opinions. Opinions shape which initiatives a
representative will support since “acting in line with what the public, or a specific segment of the
public, wants is the most likely route to re-election (or so elected officials think)” (p. 367). On
top of this, elected officials across the political spectrum and of all expertise levels were equally
affected by the WUNC characteristics (p. 377).
The breakdown of the WUNC framework supports the fact that groups of people from
weaker branches of society, with less access or funding for resources are more likely to rely on
protest strategies in order to push their agendas (Wouters & Walgrave, 2017, p. 377). This makes
sense because wealthy lobbyists or large interest organizations have direct and continuous access
to legislators whenever they need. In the late 1970s, American farmers did not have direct access
to reach policy makers in Washington, D.C., but they needed to have their voices heard in order
to promote needed change in the agricultural sector.
Knowing elected officials would not listen to a small group of farmers asking for
change, AAM used grassroots motivations and turned their movement into a nationally
recognized protest, getting the attention of policy makers and the media alike. AAM needed a
public demonstration in order to ensure their voices were being heard by leaders in Washington,
D.C. As Wouters and Walgrave (2017) put it, “Protest can push representatives toward becoming
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elite allies who, in turn, are a critical resource in the political arena” (p. 377). Using Tilly’s
WUNC framework, this thesis will assess AAM’s Tractorcade protest in Washington, D.C.
A myriad of secondary data will be used for data collection in the process of evaluating
the relationship between AAM, group theory, and policy change. The first tool that will be
utilized is a literature review on existing scholarly articles. This literature will highlight the
American Agriculture Movement, as well as agriculture policy before and after the Tractorcade.
Then, archives of primary documents published during the time of Tractorcade will be analyzed.
These archives will include newspaper articles - specifically from AAM’s periodical, American
Agriculture News - as well as farmer’s voice recorded and video recorded accounts of the events.
The majority of the primary archives were gathered in 2012 by the Kinsley Library in
Kinsley, Kansas. Joan Weaver interviewed, transcribed, and gathered documents, journal entries,
and photographs from farmers out of Edwards County, Kansas who participated in the 1979
Tractorcade. The research and oral history was headed by Weaver, who granted me full usage
permission. The Kansas Humanities Council 2012 Heritage Grant funded the “Tractorcade to
D.C.” research project conducted by the Kinsley Library, which is now publicly accessible on the
library’s website.
Weaver interviewed fourteen Tractorcade participants. Some traveled individually,
while others traveled in pairs. Weaver guided the interview, starting by asking the interviewee to
describe the state of their farm in the 1970s and how they got involved with AAM. Then, the
discussion moved on to explaining the trip to Washington, D.C., events that took place while in
Washington, D.C., what happened after the Tractorcade, and, finally, their attitudes regarding
Tractorcade and AAM as a whole. Each interview lasts around one hour and is audio recorded,
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fully transcribed, and accompanied by a short video covering a small portion of the interview; all
together, creating a full oral history of each member’s personal Tractorcade experience. Thirteen
out of the fourteen interviewees provided images, six provided additional documents, and one
member, Beverly Anderson, provided scans of the diary she kept during the Tractorcade. The full
project also includes exhibits, or brochures, covering different aspects of the Tractorcade such as
AAM buttons, police interactions, lobbying, and a timeline of the Kansas cohort’s trip to
Washington, D.C. All relevant documents, images, and newspaper articles will be accessible in
the appendix.
These oral histories from AAM members who participated in the 1979 Tractorcade will
provide context of the atmosphere and public opinion surrounding the demonstration from realtime perspectives. Using these oral histories allows for first-hand accounts of the movement and
personal opinions concerning AAM’s influence on agriculture policy under the unique
circumstances of the time. The research gathered from the oral histories will seek to provide a
deeper understanding of Tractorcade’s place under each of the WUNC criteria.
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Chapter 4: Findings
Starting as a grassroots movement out of Colorado, the American Agriculture
Movement prioritizes the importance of each individual farmer and improving the state of a
failing agriculture economy. Bud Bitner, George Bitner, Alvin Jenkins, Darrel Schroeder, Gene
Schroeder, and Van Stafford spent countless hours in the late 1970s gathering, talking, and
spreading the word about their new organization, the American Agriculture Movement (AAM).
By 1977 and 1978, AAM had spread across the country, with local offices in various states,
regions, and counties. Local leaders organized small rallies, parades, and regional conventions to
spread the word about AAM’s mission of influencing agriculture policy to help family farmers.
American Agriculture News (AAN), a periodical produced out of Iredell, Texas and
edited by Micki Nellis, sought to create a common voice for AAM and attempted to keep
members informed, even those separated by thousands of miles. On February 28, 1978, a column
printed in AAN from the AAM national headquarters aimed to reiterate the organization's
mission to their members.

American Agriculture News (“From National Headquarters”, 1978, p. 3) listed the 5 demands
they are seeking in the form of government policy.
1. 100% parity for all domestic and foreign used and, or, consumed agricultural
products.
2. All agricultural products produced for national or international food reserve shall be
contracted at 100% parity.
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3. Creation of an entity of structure composed of agricultural producers to devise and
approve policies that affect agriculture
4. Imports of all agriculture products which are domestically produced must be stopped
until 100 percent of parity is reached, thereafter imports must be limited to the amount
that the American producers cannot supply.
5. All announcements pertaining to any agricultural producing cycle shall be made far
enough in advance that the producer will have adequate time to make needed
adjustments in his operation (p. 3) [see Appendix A2].

In order to ensure policy makers became aware of their demands, AAM planned on
implementing a strike where all farmers would refuse to sell or produce any more agricultural
products, along with refusing to buy any agricultural equipment or supplies. With a disastrous
1977 Farm Bill, in 1978 AAM was worried about how prices would be raised in the coming
Farm Bill. This fear was only exasperated by the fact that President Carter and Secretary of
Agriculture Robert Bergland did not prioritize the desires of farmers or the demands from AAM.
The American Agriculture Movement began as a reactionary measure to the 1973 Farm
Bill which “created fencerow-to-fencerow production following a period of high farm prices,” so
“as supply increased, demand decreased and prices dragged… this was exaggerated because
inflation in the general economy was pushing up both annual costs of production and interest
rates” (Brown, 1985, p. 229). Small farmers across the country were looking for these issues to
be addressed year after year by the annual Farm Bill, but they were not.
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Farmers could not wait any longer for changes in agriculture; their farms and
livelihoods were on the line. Specifically, “the American farmer has been beset with factors that
affect his operation over which he has no control: embargos, price controls, inflation, depressed
prices, and unusual weather conditions. These combinations have eroded the farmers’
equity” (Thomas, 1978, p. 7) [See Appendix A3]. So, AAM members decided to take issues into
their own hands and request changes first hand from policy makers. “Specifically, AAM
demanded 100 percent parity on all farm products and immediate limitations on all meat and
livestock imports. If federal action was not forthcoming on these items by spring planting time,
AAM urged farmers to stay out of the fields” (Browne, 1983, p. 23). AAM sought to do their
first large-scale planting strike in the spring of 1978.
Parity was the most important aspect of the movement to the farmers. However, the
definition of parity was often misconstrued in the late 1970s, leaving AAM to further explain
their wishes. In the February 28, 1978 issue of AAN, parity is defined as, “The quality or
condition of being equal or equivalent; a like state or degree,” then further explaining it as,
“When a company grants an increase in wages to cover the rise in cost of living, that worker has
parity: When a labor union fights for an increase in wage and fringe benefits to bring earning
power in line with the cost of living, the struggle is for parity” (Karner, 1978, p. 3) [See
Appendix A2].
At the time of this issue's release, AAM leadership believed that their fight for parity at
the national level brought negative attention to the organization since “misinformed stories say
farmers are striking for guaranteed profits” (Karner, 1978, p. 3). However, this was not the intent
of AAM’s quest for parity, as “all farmers want is parity for what is consumed and exported…
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Equality: they want to be equivalent with the rest of the economy. They believe what they have
to sell should have equal buying power” (p. 3). Farmers wanted to make a living, be able to
support themselves, and continue harvesting on the farms which had been in many families for
generations. Without change at the national level, small family farms across the country were at
risk of bankruptcy. Individual farmers needed the ability to gain attention from national leaders
and federal policy makers immediately. AAM decided the most efficient way to make this
happen would be to take their interests directly to Washington, D.C.; therefore, the American
Agriculture Movement’s Tractorcade was born.
On February 5, 1979, around 8,000 tractors, farm vehicles, and trucks sped into the
nation’s Capitol at a swift 15 miles per hour. Coming from all over the country, these farmers and
their families came with one goal in mind: policy change. However, after the 1979
demonstration, the early to mid 1980s brought on some of the most intense hardships for
farmers. As will be elaborated on in Chapter 5, interest rates boomed to as high as 21% with
simultaneous record production numbers, exponentially decreasing the price of farm
commodities, forcing farms across the country to stop production, file for bankruptcy, or sell
their land all together. By 1984, farm debt in the United States had doubled from what it was in
1978, reaching an egregious $215 billion (“Taking”, 2016). So, what went wrong in 1979? How
did thousands of farmers on Capitol Hill all pushing for positive policy change only lead to
worsening conditions for farmers in the following years? Using the worthiness, unity, numbers,
commitment criteria described by the WUNC framework, I will examine the policy protest that
took place on the National Mall throughout February 1979.
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The Lead Up
In the months prior to the Tractorcade in February 1979, local branches of AAM spent
countless hours gathering smaller groups to rally, meeting with local policy makers, and spread
the word about the organization's mission. Members of AAM desperately needed to prove their
demands were necessary, important, and feasible. As Charles Tilly would put it, AAM needed to
prove their worthiness to policy makers, as well as grab media attention in order to have their
demands heard across the country.
A group of farmers out of Kansas began to spread the word about AAM in the fall of
1977. At that time, the gatherings consisted of small meetings among local farmers, mostly
chatting about shared hardships and how to inflict change. In September of 1977, after hearing
about a farm strike on the radio, Darrell Miller attended his first AAM meeting. Thinking back
on the meeting Miller says, “that was about the dumbest thing I’d heard of for a while, I didn’t
pay much attention to it, but as the weeks went by, there kept being more things in the paper
about it.” Eventually, “the southwest part of Kansas really got involved in a hurry. This was
strictly a word of mouth operation.” Miller remembers that by mid 1978, “the whole emphasis
was on going to Washington, D.C. and putting together a major lobbying organization and trying
to improve upon the Farm Bill that was already going to be in place” (Tractorcade Interviewees,
2012).
As the popularity of AAM continued to increase throughout the first few months of 1978,
legislative leaders began attempting to combat negative claims made by the movement and
smooth tensions concerning upcoming legislation. In February 1978, Secretary of Agriculture
Bob Bergland addressed farmers who questioned him regarding the impact of 100% parity on
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agriculture products. According to AAN, Bergland mistakenly said that parity “would cause
severe recession or inflation and be bad for the big banks,” more specifically, the Manhattan
Bank (“Bergland”, 1978, p. 1) [See Appendix A1]. Bergland’s response only certified to
members of AAM that policy leaders were more concerned with elitist opinions and personal
interests over the degrading financial conditions for farmers.
National leaders continued to deflect the wishes of AAM on February 24, 1978, when
Bud Bitner, representing AAM, met with Farm Bureau President, Allan Grant. In the meeting,
Grant claimed “if the government got totally involved in farming the way American Agriculture
suggests, that everyone would lose their farms,” as well as saying, “that raising the price would
hurt our export trade.” Bitner countered Grant’s argument by pointing out “that wheat prices paid
to the American farmer are below his cost of production, causing the farmer to have to use up
part of his equity in his farm each year he produced” (“Bergland”, 1978, p. 1). Meeting after
meeting demonstrated the failure by local leaders to truly take farmers’ interests into
consideration. By early 1978, it became evident to AAM leaders that the organization would
need to take drastic measures to make sure their voices would be heard by legislators.
By February 1978, the numbers in membership and participation in AAM were
steadily on the rise. AAN published that “the American Agriculture Movement has done more to
focus attention on the problems of American agriculture than all the other agriculture movements
in the past one hundred years. It has captured the attention of the American people from coast to
coast and border to border” (Thomas, 1978, p. 3) [See Appendix A3]. However, AAM leadership
began to realize that for many of the farmers involved, their small farms could not afford to risk
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to halt production, as the movement was asking. Therefore, throughout 1978, AAM began to
shift their attention from encouraging a strike to a more plausible tactic.
Leadership within AAM had been making numerous trips to Washington, D.C. in order
to negotiate with members of Congress, share their concerns, and offer policy alternatives, as
well as push AAM’s overall message to legislators. On top of this, larger groups of farmers
associated with AAM had made multiple trips to D.C. to rally and gather in support of 100
percent parity for farmers. Jefferis Mead and his wife, Zelma - farmers from Kansas - took on a
large responsibility of the AAM strike office in Edwards County throughout 1978. Mead and
other members of AAM from Edwards County participated in local Tractorcades, such as the one
which took place on the way to Macksville, Kansas, then proceeded to an AAM rally in Pratt,
Kansas. Kansas farmers also traveled multiple times to offices in Lewis, Kansas throughout
January and February 1978 (Tractorcade Interviewees, 2012). In the beginning of March, Mead
flew to Washington, D.C. to help with the Flexible Parity Bill introduced by Kansas Senator Bob
Dole, which passed in the Senate Agriculture Committee on March 15, 1978 with a vote of 16-1.
This bill would “provide a guaranteed established flexible price in the Farm Bill” (Tractorcade
Interviewees, 2012).
In the end, the bill could not get past the House - yet another dead end. All of these
efforts by local offices still proved to be unsuccessful in moving any meaningful legislation by
the fall of 1978. AAM needed to make a change in their lobbying efforts. They needed to show
national political leadership they were serious about making a change - that they would take
serious measures to ensure their demands would be heard.
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On March 28, 1978, AAN published a memo from National Headquarters, ending with
this call to action: “The farmers have finally found a voice - their own. No longer depending on
others to present their case to Congress, they have gone to Washington under the banner of
American Agriculture, and, as individual producers, are being listened to. They have destroyed
the myth that farmers cannot unite, and with the strength that has made them the pillars of a free
nation, they will succeed in preserving the family farm system in America” (Thomas, 1978, p. 3)
[See Appendix A3]. As 1978 edged on, AAM began a word of mouth operation to recruit farmers
to pack their tractors, trucks, trailers and make the trek to Washington, D.C. in the dead of winter.
Mr. and Mrs. Mead continued to work intently with the Tractorcade local office in
Kansas throughout the year of 1978 to gather support for the trip. The family began preparing
their tractors for their travel to D.C. on December 28, 1978. With the help of Marjorie Scheufler
and Darrel Miller, Mrs. Mead produced a letter requesting participation, support, and donations
for the demonstration, sent out on January 2, 1979 [See Appendix A8].
The Trip
The first tractors left for Washington, D.C. on January 15, 1979 from Texas and
Colorado. As AAN published on January 23, 1979, “tractor lights winked, engines roared, and
the cold night air was filled with the sights, sounds and smells of the beginning of the 1979
tractorcade to Washington” (“And They’re Off!”, 1979, p. 1) [See Appendix A5.1-A5.2]. The
group of farmers from Kansas took their tractors and vehicles and gathered in Topeka on January
18, 1979, then headed from there to Washington, D.C. Jean Titus and her husband, Jim Titus,
were one of the many couples making the trip to D.C. from Kansas. Jean made sure to mention
that “once you joined the Tractorcade, you didn’t stop or get off or take off to the side or
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anything. You stayed in line and it went like that clear up there to D.C.,” (Tractorcade
Interviewees, 2012). As more tractors joined the movement along the road, they just filed in
behind, never splitting apart or breaking the line.
Jack Wolfe, one farmer with the Kansas cohort, had an unfortunate accident with this
tractor, causing him to turn around on the first day of the trip. Although he was able to eventually
meet the group in D.C., he felt so passionate about the Tractorcade that when he got in a wreck
with his trailer, he was overcome with emotions. Lester Derley remembers that “he got in that
front seat, and he just cried. He wanted to be on that Tractorcade so bad.” Wolfe had spent weeks
preparing to travel to D.C., and he wanted his tractor to be a part of the movement.
Although the journey from Kansas was long, and sometimes dangerous, the notion of
using tractors as the mode of transportation was an integral part of the Tractorcade itself. Mead
says choosing to drive tractors to Washington, D.C. was a very intentional move on the part of
AAM. They knew driving them so slowly on the interstate would cause back up and irritation getting people’s attention. Zelma Mead described how “when we was going down the highway,
cars on the side would stop and watch all the tractors go by. They had read about us and heard
about it in the news, and they wanted to see what this was” (Tractorcade Interviewees, 2012).
As best as Darrel Miller can remember, five or six hundred tractors and trailers left
Topeka, Kansas, heading toward Washington, D.C. The tractors covered 100 miles a day,
sometimes even more, staying in the furthest right-hand lane. Once the Kansas group arrived at
the Missouri border, the governor stopped them from taking Highway I-70, turning the tractors
off-track down Highway 50. During the trip down Highway 50, Miller’s group received copious
amounts of support from the locals. Miller remembers “they were letting kids out of school,
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people were standing on overpasses, kids were waving flags… it was just an awesome
sight” (“Tractorcade Interviewees”, 2012).
All together, Miller describes three separate routes, each making their way to
Washington. A southern group from Texas, who traveled across to Atlanta, then up to D.C.
Miller’s group out of Kansas and Colorado. Finally, a northern group composed of farmers from
South Dakota, North Dakota, and Nebraska. Marjorie Scheufler and her husband also made the
trip to D.C. Marjorie distinctly remembers the difficult elements along the trip, mentioning how
their group from Kansas, detoured through Missouri, had the longest trip as well as the worst
weather. They were late to the gathering point, in Fredericksburg, by two days.
Arriving at the Capitol
Eventually though, the Kansas group made it. Lester Derley has vivid memories of the
first few days arriving in Maryland and Washington, D.C. Many of the farmers from Kansas
camped just outside of D.C. on the night before the Tractorcade officially moved into the
Capitol. Some stayed at the Cherry Hill Camp site and others stayed at a parking site on
Frostburg State College campus. Derley explains that on the first day of trying to move onto the
National Mall, his group of tractors were stopped at a fork in the road. “We were there all that
afternoon and night trying to negotiate. The police wouldn’t let us leave that area where we were
on the street” (Tractorcade Interviewees, 2012). This detour was taking place while a majority of
tractors from other routes had already made it into the National Mall.
Beverely Snyder, from Kansas, was the only woman who drove her tractor all the way
to D.C. without any help from a man; She kept a detailed journal of her experiences during the
Tractorcade [See Appendix A9]. Synder’s convoy moved into D.C. on Monday, February 5th.
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The convoy moved at a “snail’s pace” in order to keep the group together as a unit. On the day of
arrival, one farmer from Snyder’s group was arrested by law enforcement due to a
misunderstanding with an officer. By the afternoon of February 5th, tractors were everywhere,
filling downtown.
As the thousands of tractors moved into the Capitol, local law enforcement took drastic
measures to prevent disruption, which was ultimately inevitable. Law enforcement ushered the
tractors onto the National Mall, where they would quickly become surrounded.

Recounting his experience in 1979, Miller (“Tractorcade Interviewees”, 2012) stated:
I couldn’t really put a handle on how many [tractors] there were, but it was big… well,
I mean, it stretched basically from the reflecting pool at the foot of the Capitol clear
down to 14th Street… the idea was to have this big rally up on the Capitol steps… so
everyone parked their stuff on the inside of the Mall. The Metropolitan Police and the
D.C. Capitol police started bringing in every trash truck and every piece of equipment
they could find and started parking it bumper to bumper. They basically impounded
everybody that was in there.

Miller also mentioned that some tractors were able to park in front of the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA) building. Eventually, a rally was able to take place on the
Capitol steps around 2 o’clock on February 5th. On the 6th, Snyder made a trip to the Skyline
Inn office, where AAM national headquarters worked out of during the stay in D.C. There were
farmers manning phones, meeting each other, and reflecting on the events of the previous day.
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During the first few days on Capitol Hill, farmers encountered violence with law
enforcement, and vise versa. Police officers equipped themselves with riot gear, and a select few
farmers took extreme measures during their entry into the city. Jean Titus remembers that a
couple of farmers brought a thresher, which is a cotton picking machine, with a bale of cotton,
and lit the vehicle on fire. Jean believes they used this as a tactic to get attention and bring
awareness to AAM’s cause, albeit an unnecessary one. Snyder documents hearing true reports of
tear gas being used by law enforcement. A farmer from Missouri used the blade on his tractor to
move three police cars and some motorcycles, causing the police to crack the tractor’s window
and drag the man out.
Some farmers stayed for a few days, others for weeks. Tensions were high at the
beginning, with many locals ignorant of AAM’s purpose disrupting everyday life on Capitol Hill.
Marjorie Scheufler remembers one instance while lobbying in D.C., “We were walking down the
street, and of course the boys had their AAM hats on. Some city guy said some snide remark
about farmers. And you know how big Alvin is, Alvin turned around and just decked that guy!
Smacked him and knocked him down” (Tractorcade Interviewees, 2012). However, as the days
went on, the farmers began forming connections with both locals and police officers. Miller said
many of the farmers became friends with local law enforcement and highway patrolmen over the
course of the trip to Washington, D.C. Miller even mentioned, “it was amazing how so many of
these kids had grown up on a farm and couldn’t stay there because there wasn’t nothing to take
over for the family.” Additionally, while AAM was in Washington, D.C., over 20 inches of snow
disabled the city on February 18, 1979. “All of the sudden [the farmers] went from being the
enemy to being their friends because nobody could do anything and farmers were hauling
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doctors and nurses to hospitals with tractors. They even took these big ones with the blades out
to the national airport and had them cleaning off runways” (Tractorcade Interviewees, 2012).
Miller mentioned how these few days of helping people “redeemed” the farmers’ reputation with
the locals. After this, many families would stop by the National Mall, find a farmer or two, and
invite them over to their home for a Sunday dinner. Furthermore, at the time of the Tractorcade,
the Red Cross “ran dangerously low on blood supplies” due to the bad weather; farmers even
helped the Red Cross by donating blood” (“Farmers”, 1979, p. 1) [See Appendix A6]. Once the
locals realized the farmer’s movement was founded on good intentions, many were genuinely
interested to learn more about AAM, their demonstrations, and their overall goals.
As the farmers got settled on the National Mall, they even used their time to sightsee
and act as tourists around the Capitol. Jean Titus mentioned since the tractors were trapped
within the National Mall, they couldn’t get out and no one else could get in. The farmers
practically had free run of the government buildings within the mall, such as the Smithsonian and
other museums.
Most importantly, AAM made quick use of their time in the Capitol, attending
meetings and lobbying for legislation. By Wednesday, February 7, 1979, many farmers were
meeting with members of Congress, Senators and USDA representatives. In her journal, Snyder
mentioned that overall spirits were high and attitudes were positive. Marjorie and Ed Scheufler
stayed in D.C. for three weeks. Marjorie stated that “we were down on the Hill every day… It
was important that there were numbers of us. We didn’t care who the Congressman was, if we
could go in and lay a piece of literature on their desk and say that we were there. We wanted
them to know the presence of the farmers in Washington D.C.,” Jeff Mead was able to meet with
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Senator Bob Dole in his office during the Tractorcade. Lester Derley joined a group who sat in
the visitor’s balcony in the House of Representatives, as well as visiting numerous Senatorial
offices. Derley made sure to mention that he did not do any of the talking, instead left that up to
the AAM members who took on the bulk of lobbying responsibilities. Jack Wolfe, another farmer
from Kansas, attended one meeting with the Secretary of Agriculture, of which he remembers
that “all us old Tractorcade boys were there. There was standing room only” (Tractorcade
Interviewees, 2012).
Also according to Snyder’s journal, on February 6, 1979, Kansas Senator Nancy
Kassebaum held a conference in the Dirksen Building with farmers who filled the entire room, of
course with standing room only. “Kassebaum began by explaining she would not co-sponsor
legislation to increase the loan rate to 90% of parity. Her reason was that this legislation would
never pass, so it would be dishonest to co-sponsor it, but she would vote for it if it came up for a
vote.” Miller said that of course, during the Tractorcade, legislation was constantly being
introduced in hearings and committees, with farmers providing testimony. Unfortunately, giving
the perspective of the farmer did not seem to be enough. “We were going in there and
testifying… we had some sharp guys. We put together a lot of good stuff, but we found out real
quick that it went in one ear and out the other one” (Tractorcade Interviewees, 2012).
As the weeks passed, law enforcement was ready to move the tractors out of the
National Mall one way or another. Miller said “by this time, the guys had been up there a long
time… that was their program. ‘I want to drive. I want to go up there. I want to do my thing, but
when I get there, I don’t know what to do.’ They weren’t big on going out and talking and
lobbying, and that’s what they wanted everyone doing, but a lot of them weren’t cut out for that,
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you know. So, they were ready to go home anyway” (Tractorcade Interviewees, 2012). farmers
left D.C. after three to four days, many stayed for two to three weeks, and the final tractors left
the National Mall by June 1979.
The Aftermath
After returning home from D.C., the group from Kansas reflected on their journey with
the Tractorcade. Overall, most of the families were proud of their efforts with AAM and had a
positive outlook on the time spent in D.C., but almost everyone was aware their efforts had little
effect on legislation surrounding their goals. Both Jeff and Zelma Mead said the demonstration
was successful in bringing attention to their cause, even though there were not tangible results.
Jeff saying “I would like to think that surely it did some good,” and Zelma following up with, “I
think it brought attention to the problem more.” Zelma realized that lobbying for policy was
more complex than just asking for change, concerning members of Congress, stating: “You
know, their hands were probably just as tied as they are now,” Jeff followed up saying, “But, I’m
glad we worked at it,” (Tractorcade Interviewees, 2012).
Lester Derley and his wife Beverly did not stay active with AAM after the Tractorcade,
Lester even stated that “American Ag, as far as I can remember, kind of dissolved after a few
years.” On top of this, the Derleys eventually had to sell their farm in 1986 and instead merge
business with a neighbor. Derley remembers that interest rates on loans for irrigation were
between 18 and 21 percent, saying “you couldn’t keep things going with that. We got
overextended.” Derley remembers that a lot of small farms went out of business due to the
circumstances in the 1980s when small farmers were sunk by high interest rates and low prices.
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Jack Wolfe, who wrecked his tractor at the very beginning of the trip, was not
convinced that the Tractorcade was a complete success - in the sense of changing prices and
policy for farmers. He stated that it was more of “an educational thing. We got to know our
Congressmen and Senators and so on, but I don’t suppose in dollars and cents it done any good.”
However, on the positive side, Wolfe mentioned how AAM caused him to pay attention to the
policy and economics surrounding his farming operation for the first time, saying, “I didn’t take
no interest in politics until this came along” (Tractorcade Interviewees, 2012).
Marjorie Scheufler and her husband Ed were very invested in AAM and the
Tractorcade in 1979. Marjorie says, “It was something I really, really believed in… I’m not sure
how much good we did in changing any laws, but I think we changed perceptions. We had
speakers that were so articulate, men that wrote books afterwards. Educated men.” Marjorie was
also proud of WIFE, Women Interested in Farm Economics, an organization born out of AAM
support. Marjorie explains how WIFE was very active throughout Kansas, and even thinks there
is still a convention held by the organization today [See Appendix A10].
Concerning the long-term effects of AAM, Majorie believes that “people are more
aware of agriculture. They don’t think their milk comes from the grocery store so much anymore.
There was a lot of education going on for the public. The one thing we got a lot of local publicity
when we came into a town, but nationally, we became very disenchanted because nationally, the
news was managed. There was no national news that said there were 8,000 farm tractors coming
into Washington D.C.”(Tractorcade Interviewees, 2012). Along the trip to D.C., Tractorcade
participants would stop to pick up local newspapers hoping to see word of their demonstration
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traveling across the country. Most of the time there was nothing, which was surprising and
somewhat off-putting to AAM members.
On top of this, Marjorie remembers how in the 1980s many farms no longer had the
means to support entire families. Men had to go find a job at night, and women had to go to town
and find jobs to help pay the bills. In 1984 and 1985, farm conditions were so devastating that
Marjorie and Ed were preparing to lose their farm. “Ed and I took advantage of going in for
mental health evaluations and what that could do to help us to figure out what we were going to
do to live” (Tractorcade Interviewees, 2012). Family farms throughout the nation were not
prepared for conditions to worsen in the 1980s, especially after all of the work AAM put in to
influence policy and legislation in the late 1970s.
Just as the other families, the Tituses did not stay active with AAM after the
Tractorcade. Jean does not remember Kansas farmers remaining active with AAM in general.
Likewise, Jean does not believe the demonstrations made an impact on parity or farm prices,
saying, “it might have brought a few people like Senators and the like’s attention to it, but they
weren’t interested particularly in whether the farmer made a living or not.” Speaking on behalf of
her late husband, Jean knows Jim was proud they made the trip to D.C. “He thought it would
make an improvement. I’ve no doubt it helped, but we didn’t get parity. But that was kind of
asking for quite a bit, I guess.” In hindsight, many of the Tractorcade participants realized asking
for 100 parity might have been too far of a stretch, but they wished more could have been done
to help farmers.
Jean also touched on the attitudes regarding the Tractorcade, both immediately
afterwards and even today. She believes there was widespread discouragement after the
!44

Tractorcade took place. Farmers were disappointed because, “they thought it would really help,
and when we went, you couldn’t find a paper along the way very often that there would be an
article in there about what was going on. Today, if you say something about the Tractorcade or
AAM, they don’t know what you’re even talking about.” (Tractorcade Interviewees, 2012). Jean
finds it astounding that a fleet of 8,000 tractors and thousands more farmers, stationed at the
nation’s Capitol for weeks, is not more commonplace knowledge as a social movement. The lack
of new legislation which met AAM’s stipulations could be part of the reason for the 1979
Tractorcade being lost in agriculture policy and economic history.
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Chapter 5: Discussion
Concluding AAM and their utilization of Tractorcade as a failure due to organizational
or administrative issues would not give the event enough credit for its success as a demonstration
of farmer’s hardships. AAM was able to successfully gather in order to voice the farmer’s
opinions, but was unable to comprehensively create a social movement that forced new policy
introduction and implementation. Revisiting Charles Tilly’s social movement framework, the
four WUNC components - worthiness, unity, numbers, commitment - as well as using group
theory outlook, it is possible to expose gaps in AAM’s overall execution before, during, and after
the Tractorcade. These perspectives will provide a deeper understanding as to why the
Tractorcade was unable to reach its full potential as a social movement ending with policy
change. This chapter will also touch on the overall outcomes of the Tractorcade as well as take a
look at the economic conditions faced by farmers at the onset of the 1980s.
Tractorcade as WUNC Criteria
WORTHINESS
As farmers with no political, lobbying, or legislative backgrounds, gathering from all
ends of the country, confirming worthiness proved to be a tall hurdle for AAM to overcome. As
described in Chapter 3, worthiness in terms of Charles Tilly’s WUNC framework, can be defined
as the actions and demeanor of the protesters. Additionally, “by behaving in a worthy fashion,
protesters signal to politicians that they are good citizens and that the protest’s claim is supported
by a segment of the public that deserves to get what it wants because it behaves in an appropriate
manner” (Wouters & Walgrave, 2017, p. 367). Demonstrating peaceful behavior in order to gain
respect from legislators was a difficult task to accomplish for select members of AAM, especially

!46

during the first days arriving in Washington, D.C. As mentioned, some farmers used desperate
tactics upon their entry into the Capitol. These tactics caused damage to vehicles and Capitol
grounds, sometimes with violence ensuing. Immediately, the reputation of AAM and their
mission with the Tractorcade was tainted by unnecessary aggression.
Hostility between the farmers and locals only involved a small proportion of participants
and almost completely faded as AAM’s stay elongated. However, a peaceful entry into
downtown would have expanded the chances of policy makers taking the demands of AAM more
seriously. Instead, AAM leaders had to spend their first encounters with legislators confirming
the seriousness of their mission and demands. Moreover, much of AAM’s dissatisfaction relied
on the assumption that policy makers and big business were to blame for the current conditions.
Specifically, “ ‘corporates’ increasingly were portrayed as having ruined that economy through
their monopolistic handling of agricultural products” (Dinse & Browne, 1985, p. 232). This
attitude against leaders created a rift in the relationships between many farmers and policy
makers as they attempted to work together.
For many members of Congress, farmers were not the typical demographic to show up in
Washington, D.C. and negotiate for themselves. Only a small percentage of the farmers in
Washington, D.C. were able to speak on behalf of the group, properly articulating their demands
to legislators. This was an impediment to AAM’s lobbying efforts since groups are more likely to
“succeed in pushing its agenda through the parliament when it has strong bargaining skills…
Persons that are well known and respected in society could easily influence decision makers to
support their ideas in parliament” (Anyebe, 2018, p. 12). The compounding effect of violence at
the onset of the demonstration along with AAM’s use of amateur negotiators did not instill an
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atmosphere of trust or professionalism between AAM and policy makers, hindering the policy
making process from day one.
Not only did the majority of AAM members refrain from speaking up in meetings and
hearings, many policy makers were unsure of how to receive the demands of AAM. This is
especially true of members of Congress representing states or districts less involved in the
agriculture sector. These members were not as aware of the conditions farmers were protesting
against and were unfamiliar with 100% parity on farm commodities; therefore, they were less
inclined to take the demands of AAM seriously. Even Kansas Senator Bob Dole, who seemed to
be on the side of the farmers from the very beginning by traveling to Kansas to participate in
local tractorcades and agreeing to speak with farmers at various local hearings, eventually took a
more elitist perspective on the Tractorcade. According to Marjorie Scheufler, at one gathering of
midwest farmers in Topeka, Kansas, Senator Dole told the farmers to go home and let him
handle the legislation (“Tractorcade Interviewees”, 2012). Senator Dole no longer believed that
AAM members were equipped with the tools necessary to lobby for themselves; that is when
many Kansas farmers stopped voting for him.
Another factor that worked against the farmer’s worthiness was their goals. AAM
specifically wanted “100% parity for all domestic and foreign used and, or, consumed
agricultural products.” To AAM, this seemed like a reasonable demand, but elected
representatives were aware that such legislation would never pass in Congress. For most
members of Congress, their main concern is supporting their constituency, who mostly acts as
consumers. Accomplishing 100% parity on farm commodities for farmers would inevitably drive
up the costs of goods for consumers, angering constituents. Not to mention, increasing the cost of
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farm commodities would ultimately hurt the number of goods being exported from the US - a
trade market which was booming during the 1970s. This made it extremely difficult for
legislators to sponsor a parity bill, which would possibly risk their legislative reputation. Onehundred percent parity was a non-negotiable and was the centerpiece of AAM and Tractorcade,
so they lobbied for parity as an all-or-nothing alternative. This likely made it troublesome for
policy makers to concoct a bill that both satisfied AAM’s demands and would feasibly pass in the
House and Senate. This gridlock on policy and the innocent ignorance of some members made
AAM’s mission difficult for legislators to denote AAM as worthy of their attention, let alone
outright support.
UNITY
Gathering as one was never an issue for AAM during the Tractorcade. Unity was always
at the forefront of their operation, and leadership knew it was the only way they would be able to
invoke change. AAM understood that if all of their members could not stand together as one,
they would not be able to persuade legislators to stand up for their case. Throughout 1978,
organization leaders pleaded for their members to come together in order to promote the
demands of AAM. In the February 28, 1978 issue of AAN, a message on a potential strike from
national headquarters read: “We need commitments at home! Now is not the time to decide
whether or not to plant on the basis of what your neighbor plans to do. Now is the time to stand
UNITED… Producers united together will have to find a solution and carry out its
implementation” (Thomas, 1978, p. 3) [See Appendix A3]. It only took a few more months after
this issue was printed for AAM to realize the best chance in being heard would be to unite and
travel to Washington, D.C. together.
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In order to ensure that each subset of tractors, coming from different regions of the
country would arrive in Washington D.C. at the same time, AAM leadership used a map with
toothpicks, measured to scale of 100 miles on the map, and did the math to see when each
caravan should leave their departure point. This ensured all the tractors would roll into
Washington D.C. at relatively the same time. Moreover, even as the farmers moved into the city,
they made sure to stay together as groups, being careful not to become separated by traffic stops,
law enforcement, or civilian vehicles. Thousands of tractors lined the city, and this spectacle
made a statement: Everyone was aware AAM had arrived and wanted to know why the farmers
had come to Washington, D.C.
Many of the tactics AAM used to prove their unity to policy makers were visual. The
most important visual tool used was their tractors, as well as other farm vehicles and machinery.
Using the tractors as the mode of transportation immediately sent a message to legislators and
the public that farmers had come together from various states, and were seeking the same goals.
Another visual tactic AAM used was plastering their name and message on members and
vehicles. Many members took the liberty to attach signs and slogans to their tractors for the trip
to D.C. Additionally, once the farmers arrived at the Capitol, they made sure to come dressed in
their typical attire, such as overalls, along with their AAM hats as they roamed the National Mall
and attended meetings with members of Congress. Even leadership encouraged farmers to use
their AAM hats as a persuasion, or possibly intimidation, technique, saying, “We have to tell
[we’ve arrived] by our presence - wearing strike caps” (Nellis, 1978, p. 1) [See Appendix A4].
Due to this, no one in D.C. had to second guess which organization individuals belonged to or
which message they were promoting.
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Most importantly, AAM’s overall goal was extremely concise and unified from the
very beginning: they wanted 100% parity. Everyone who was a member of AAM or participated
in the Tractorcade knew that 100% parity was the movement’s main goal. They plastered “100%
Parity for Farmers!” all over their tractors, put it on buttons, and spread the phrase through word
of mouth. The idea of 100% parity for farmers and the American Agriculture Movement as a
whole undoubtedly went hand in hand, especially during their stay in Washington, D.C.
NUMBERS
The large number of farmers participating in the Tractorcade is one of the main reasons
AAM and Tractorcade itself was able to gain so much attention as they arrived simultaneously in
Washington, D.C. Having vast engagement in the form of participants - in this case, tractors and
farmers - allows for policy makers to become instantly aware of AAM upon their arrival. The
Tractorcade was composed of over 8,000 tractors from all over the country. AAM’s presence in
Washington, D.C. could not be ignored by locals, law enforcement, or elected officials. Without
the extent of participation by AAM members in the Tractorcade, the presence of AAM
participants in D.C. would not have been as important or influential to policy makers at the time.
Additionally, since there were so many farmers in town to spread the word about
“100% parity” and AAM’s demands, they were able to have face-to-face interactions with
members of Congress in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, along with leaders on
government agencies, committees, and other agriculture related organizations. The scope of
AAM’s presence while their members were in D.C. is what put them on the policy map.
Prior to shifting attention to the Tractorcade demonstration, AAM was focused on
implementing a great farm strike. For this option to be carried out, they needed to access local
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strike offices in farm communities all over the United States. By 1978, AAM had spread to 40
different states with upwards of 1,100 local offices. Once AAM started planning for a nationwide tractorcade, these “strike offices” focused their attention on gathering participants for the
tractorcade, collecting money, and preparing for the trip. Eventually, the numerous strike offices
became AAM’s implementation tool to continue spreading the word about the organization’s
mission to help improve the economic conditions for farmers.
COMMITMENT
The issue AAM faced with this component of the social movement framework was the
long-term commitment to the cause. Unfortunately, long-term commitment is exactly what AAM
needed for any true change to occur. The commitment specifically to the Tractorcade by
participants was intense and steadfast. They traveled cross-country in order to rally despite the
long distance, bad weather conditions, traffic obstacles, and money constraints. Members were
intently determined to have their voices heard by policy makers, up-close and in person.
On the other hand, for the large demands AAM was asking for, a couple-week lobbying
stint in D.C. was not enough time to follow through with implementation of their goals through
legislation. Although many groups of farmers stayed for two to three weeks, many farmers began
heading home starting on February 8, 1979, just three days after arriving. As many of the Kansas
farmers were able to attest to, after individuals began to arrive home after the Tractorcade, their
involvement with AAM dwindled shortly thereafter. Most of the Kansas farmers never attended
AAM meetings or gatherings ever again.
Most farmers do not have significant disposable income or free time to dedicate
themselves to an uprising with consistent lobbying, especially during the financial conditions of
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the late 1970s and early 1980s. In the farming environment, a quick fix is better than a long term
approach. Specifically, “farmers can be organized around a plan or idea, but their continued
commitment is unlikely” (Browne, 1985, p. 231). In the case of AAM, the lofty goals of the
movement required long-term, intensive commitment to the cause by its members. The drastic
drop-off of participation post-Tractorcade made it extremely difficult for AAM to maintain their
credibility with national agriculture and legislative leaders.
As member participation continued to decrease throughout 1979, AAM could no longer
focus on pushing for legislative changes, as they needed to turn their attention toward keeping
the American Agriculture Movement alive. Woefully, by June 1979, AAM “estimated that
between 60 and 90 percent of their state local offices were totally inactive” (Browne, 1985, p.
277). On the other hand, one positive that came out of the demonstration was the creation of a
single AAM office with one paid lobbyist to take over the work in Washington, D.C. Although
there was a loose power structure, they elected Marvin Meek from Texas as the National Chair in
1979 (Browne, 1985, p. 228). The organization as a whole attempted to stay active throughout
1980 by planning smaller demonstrations and continued issuing of American Agricultural News.
However, their motives were never recaptured by public representatives or new legislative
initiatives. Failure of long-term commitment by members of AAM, even those who were fiercely
involved during the Tractorcade, led to the eventual demise of AAM as a comprehensive
organization at the beginning of the 1980s.
Group Theory and Tractorcade
Taking a look back at Chapter 2, group theory can explain the shortcomings of AAM and
their usage of Tractorcade to influence policy change. It is well known that, according to group
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theory, the strength of the relationship between interest groups - such as the American
Agriculture Movement - and policy makers is what determines the extent of influence said group
will have on policy outcomes. As stated on page 3, interest groups are able to gain more leverage
on their agenda if the group works to push their interests for an extended period of time. AAM
most vigorously pushed their agenda through Tractorcade only in the first weeks, as many
farmers and their accompanying vehicles departed the National Mall after just three days.
Although many of the farmers had accounts of building relationships with D.C. locals
and law enforcement officers, many of the farmers participating in the Tractorcade were unable
to truly foster meaningful relationships with politicians. Those important policy makers were
busy holding hearings and committee meetings to sort out the chaos caused by the
demonstration, not out shaking hands or holding conversations with the average farmer on the
National Mall. The majority of the Tractorcade participants did not feel knowledgeable enough
to speak on behalf of the movement to various policy makers, instead just contributed by
showing up to meetings and adding to the number of farmers present.
Group theory says extensive interaction with the iron triangle - a network including
interest groups, bureaucratic agencies, and congressional committees - is vital to legislative
success on the part of the interest group. During their time in D.C., AAM had brief
correspondence with those involved in the agriculture iron triangle, including the Senate
Committee on Agriculture, leaders within the USDA, and United States Secretary of Agriculture,
Bob Bergland. AAM members were able to fill rooms and make their presence known to policy
makers, but the majority of farmers lacked meaningful exchanges that would put further
emphasis on the policy changes they wanted. As with the commitment criteria under Tilly’s
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WUNC framework, long term commitment is essential for strengthening the iron triangle. As
members of AAM left D.C. and went back to their normal lives as farmers, AAM subsided as a
strong interest group, dismantling the possibility of forming a strong iron triangle. Due to the
lack of lobbying and legislative experience on AAM’s end, they desperately needed knowledge
and full support from agricultural agencies and committees; this support they ultimately failed to
receive.
Another major factor that hindered the success of AAM was elite theory taking
precedence over group theory. In this case, elite theory can be defined as the argument that “U.S.
policy making is dominated by individuals who have substantial economic resources,” as well as
those with “social status or institutional position—such as the occupancy of key managerial roles
in corporations, or top-level positions in political parties, in the executive, legislative, or judicial
branches of government, or in the highest ranks of the military” (Gilen & Page, 2014, p. 566).
During the time of AAM, the uprising of large-scale agriculture and factory farming was
beginning to undermine the work of small farmers, pushing them out of business. These large
corporations have copious amounts of economic power, as well as the support of leaders within
government institutions who support farm corporations as a tool for cheaper, more efficient
production.
Moreover, these corporations have strong ties to policy makers; therefore, they would
have substantial pull on the types of legislation introduced in Congress. Elite theory also
suggests that there is a strong “unity through common backgrounds,” (Gilen & Page, 2014, p.
566). Historically, policy makers favor the demands of economic elites - those who have strong
holdings in the market - over small business owners and the consumer. This further explains why
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leaders in government are more apt to listen to professional lobbyists and corporation leaders
over the demands of a common farmer, like those who participated in the Tractorcade.
Elite theory even took hold within the AAM organization itself. One of AAM’s main
talking points was that their organization consists completely of everyday farmers. However, as
AAM grew, certain farmers inevitably rose up the ranks, acquiring leadership positions. These
so-called ‘elites’ within the organization had the most leverage, as they were the members talking
directly to policy makers and spending the most time in Washington, D.C. Even though
nationwide participation drastically declined following the Tractorcade, an AAM lobbying office
was established in D.C. and the organization’s leaders were able to continue lobbying on the Hill,
attend hearings, and talk with legislators, while the rest of the members had to return home and
do all they could to keep their farms in business (Dinse & Brown, 1985, p. 227). This separation
between members created a disconnect across the organization, contributing to decreasing
membership rates.
Breaking the 1979 Tractorcade down by the social movement framework’s criteria and
aspects of group theory lets us understand the demonstration’s shortcomings; shortcomings that
ultimately caused AAM to fall short of their policy goals. The American Agriculture Movement
was never able to bring ‘100% parity for farmers’ to fruition. Instead, Tractorcade participants
dispersed from the National Mall and put their tractors back to work on small family farms
across the country. After traveling for thousands of miles and having their voices heard by top
policy makers, the last thing AAM expected was for conditions to worsen after the Tractorcade.
Unfortunately, that is exactly what happened. The beginning of the 1980’s brought the onset of
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arguably the worst agricultural economic conditions farmers would have to face for decades,
only further damaging any lasting impression left on policy makers by AAM.
Policy Outcomes
Despite the struggles faced by workers during the Great Depression, the 1980s,
specifically 1981 through 1986, led to the worst financial crisis faced by farmers up until that
point. Many family farms across the country were forced to file for bankruptcy, sell their farms,
or merge with neighbors in order to keep their business afloat. These struggles changed the
landscape of rural communities and changed the farming industry indefinitely.
The crisis that took place in the 1980s resulted heavily from the increasingly unstable
economic conditions in the United States throughout the 1970s. This era of economic instability
is often remembered as “stagflation,” a period where high inflation rates and high unemployment
existed in the market simultaneously. As for the agricultural economy, since the market for food
exports was thriving, Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz encouraged farmers in 1971 to farm
“fence row to fence row” with hopes of increasing production and export numbers (“American
Agriculture Political”, n.d.). Farmers were exceedingly encouraged to invest in their farms since,
“various price support and supply control programs were used to stabilize and maintain the
prices of selected agricultural commodities at artificially high levels” (Barnett, 2000, p. 369).
Furthermore, farm services were incentivizing farmers to take loans for land by offering interest
rates below the market rate. Markets were simultaneously opening and encouraging the
widespread, international exporting of U.S. agricultural products. Due to these incentives, U.S.
exports in grain and wheat products more than doubled in the first half of the 1970s. The high
rate of returns led to even further investments in farm capital. However as commodity prices
!57

leveled off by the end of the 1970s, “many agricultural producers who owned land found their
wealth was increasing dramatically, while at the same time they were experiencing cash-flow
difficulties,” (Barnett, 2000, p. 372). These unstable financial conditions created the perfect
recipe for a disastrous agricultural economy as the 1980s rolled around.
Contradictory fiscal policy in the 1980s between the administration and the Federal
Reserve caused commodity prices to drastically fall by 1986. This was due to major losses in the
export market, leading to a decrease in “average net farm income in real terms for the five-year
period 1980-84,” which was, “35 percent less than for the period 1975-79” (Barnett, 2000, p.
375). Farms were going bankrupt across the country, and the Farm Credit System was losing
billions of dollars. Families with generations of farm capital were losing everything they had, but
farmers were not the only party suffering. Schools, churches, and small businesses in many rural
communities also carried the burden of the farm crisis.
Due to federal funding for farmers mandated by the Food Security Act of 1985 and a
decreasing inflation rate, financial conditions for farmers steadily improved toward the end of the
1980s (Barnett, 2000, p. 377). The prolonged economic difficulties farmers had to endure
throughout the 1970s and 1980s unveils an unstable agricultural infrastructure that holds
American farmers perpetually at-risk. The issues farmers inevitably faced in the 1980s were too
deep-rooted to be solved by a two week long social movement campaign such as the Tractorcade.
Even if AAM was able to have their demands - 100% parity - achieved with new policy, they
would not have escaped the underlying issues that caused prolonged economic distress in the
agriculture sector at the end of the twentieth century.
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Despite the fact that AAM was not able to have the majority of their policy demands met,
some positive outcomes did arise from the Tractorcade. As Marjorie Scheufler mentioned,
Women Involved in Farm Economics (WIFE) stemmed from the work many farmers’ wives
accomplished leading up to the Tractorcade. WIFE’s mission is to “[improve] profitability in
production agriculture through education, cooperative efforts, and building networks” (WIFE,
n.d.). WIFE, which began in Nebraska, arrived in Lewis, Kansas, in March 1978 and had strong
Kansas involvement throughout the beginning of the 1980s, even as participation in AAM
declined. WIFE is now a national organization which holds annual conventions, legislative
conferences in Washington, D.C., and funds scholarships. During the Tractorcade, involvement
in WIFE boomed as many women passed out buttons, met with policy makers, and helped
organize lobbying events during AAM’s time in D.C. These women took this initiative home
after the Tractorcade, recruiting more members and staying active in the organization [See
Appendix A10].
One piece of legislation that AAM was particularly proud of was H.R. 2727, the Meat
Import Act of 1979, which set limits on the amount of meat and veal which can be imported to
the United States while helping protect prices for American meat producers. H.R. 2727 passed
the House on November 14, 1979 and passed in the Senate on December 18, 1979. This piece of
legislation which AAM worked hard to support, gave AAM leaders a glimpse of hope in the face
of worsening policy alternatives (“AAM Tastes Sweet Victory of Success”, 1979, p. 1) [See
Appendix A7].
As many of the Kansas farmers touched on, Tractorcade participants were still proud of
the work they accomplished during the demonstration regardless of the policy outcomes.
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Participating in the Tractorcade allowed them to gain a deeper understanding of the legislative
process, helping them understand the reasoning behind why agriculture conditions were unstable.
Seeing negotiations take place in D.C. equipped farmers with the tools they needed to go back
home and continue to advocate for the agriculture community in any way they could. Witnessing
first hand what it takes to move policy on the national scale encouraged the farmers to stay
actively informed on politics regarding the agricultural economy.
The major positive outcome resulting from AAM’s 1979 Tractorcade was the attention it
brought to the deteriorating farming conditions. The grassroots uprising organized by AAM
during a time with minimal communication options, to the extent to which AAM was able to
gather, was unprecedented. These farmers were fighting for their livelihoods and were willing to
go to extreme lengths in hopes of change. Even though legislators were widely unable to meet
AAM’s demands, they took time to hear the farmers' concerns and listen to their personal stories
of struggle. For an organization like AAM, the defining factor is going to be an attentiongrabbing demonstration like Tractorcade. Groups such as these, “of course, will not always win,
but, properly mobilized and activated, they can cause definite and observable responses in nearly
all related political circles” (Browne, 1983, p. 32). Weeks of meetings, conferences, and
committee hearings resulted from the impact of the Tractorcade. Additionally, the demonstration
kept farmers and agriculture needs on the forefront of legislators’ minds, as the administration
scrambled to solve the myriad of economic issues entrenching the agriculture sector in the 1980s.
Moreover, the vast majority of the public, who act solely as consumers of farm products, was
ignorant of the issues facing producers in the 1970s prior to the Tractorcade. As thousands of
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tractors passed through towns across the country, agricultural hardships were brought to light and
the farmers received wide public support for their cause.
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Chapter 6: Expansion and Broader Perspectives
The Current State of Farm Policy
Unfortunately in the case of small farmers, it pays to be big. As the population grows and
the demand for efficient, cheap commodity production continues to increase, the economic
playing field favors industrial, large-scale farming. These institutions are able to foster financial
incentives and the means to create connections with agencies and legislators - as explained by
the Iron Triangle and group theory. The 2017 Census of Agriculture showed that the number of
farms as well as the amount of land in the U.S. used for farming has continued to decline over
the years, respectively decreasing by 2-3 percent from 2012 to 2017 (Daniels, 2019). In
conjunction with that data, the USDA Economic Research Service reports that “large-scale
family farms make up about 3 percent of farms but 44 percent of the value of
production,” (2021). This shows that the current farm system favors large-scale, technologically
advanced farming which allows for more product to be produced on less land.
The Farm Bill, which received much attention by AAM in the 1970s, continues to be
renewed. New amendments which attempt to address economic and production concerns as they
arise are introduced every four years. As always, the trade-offs between the needs of producers
and the wants of consumers complicate the policy making process when it comes to agriculture.
The current Farm Bill, the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 covers funding for fiscal year
2019 through fiscal year 2023. The majority of funding is focused on welfare programs,
specifically Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), to which 73% of funding in the
Farm Bill is designated. Moreover, the rest of the funding is thinly distributed between
commodities, crop insurance, and conservation efforts. The 2018 Farm Bill provides further
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evidence on how policy makers focus primarily on the wellbeing of consumers, even when
dealing with legislation sought to “improve agriculture.”
On the other hand, policy makers have begun to understand the high risk environment
farmers produce within. In the 2014 Farm Bill, the federal government included programs which
sought to support farmers and protect them from price loss and commodity risk, specifically
Agriculture Risk Coverage-County (ARC-CO) and Price Loss Coverage (PLC). Together, the
two programs seek to diminish revenue risk in the agriculture industry (Motamed, 2018).
Although legislators have attempted to support agriculture producers, the system is imperfect.
Social Movements on a Broader Scale
Much like the situation faced by the 1979 Tractorcade, modern day social movements and
protests struggle to have their demands met with actual policy implementation. The gap between
what AAM demonstrators wished to accomplish and the extent to which policy makers moved
new legislation is not an uncommon situation among social movements. The outcomes from
AAM’s Tractorcade were simple: the demonstration led to increased attention and education of
others concerning the issue at hand. As we have moved into the 21st century, gathering
widespread attention is as easy as ever. With highly involved news and the widespread use of
social media, even small protests can have profound effects on attitudes and public support
regarding salient issues in American politics.
Social protests have become an increasingly used tool by activist groups and
organizations in order to bring awareness to an issue. Protests such as Black Lives Matter
(BLM), March for Our Lives, Pride, Right to Life, as well as protests concerning reproductive
rights, and women’s rights have become repeatedly familiar scenes documented on American
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soil. Following the death of George Floyd in May 2020, the BLM protests took center stage as
some of the most influential and widespread protests in American history (Heaney, 2020).
Throughout the summer of 2020, BLM protests sprouted across the entire country, with
participants by the hundreds of thousands. Protestors joined from a wide range of backgrounds,
ethnicities, and social statuses. BLM activists and their mission were at the forefront of mass
media for months on end.
With endless communication options and attention-grabbing media coverage, it is
easier than ever to enlist a social movement as a tool for policy change. However, as supported
throughout this thesis, protests and social movements often fail to see legislation all the way
through Congress, never passing into law. Heaney (2020), in his article placing social
movements at the center of modern American politics, still recognizes that “a more realistic
option may be for existing political actors to find better ways to pursue their goals within the
existing constitutional framework.” Transitioning from the street protests to the policy arena,
BLM movement has created and endorsed countless pieces of legislation, including the
BREATHE Act. Most of these initiatives are introduced but never acted on, or never introduced
in Congress at all. Social movements today have no issue gathering public support, but much like
AAM, often face setbacks when seeking to bring their demands to fruition through policy
implementation.
Limitations
With the bulk of the research for this thesis coming from secondary source documents,
such as interviews with Tractorcade participants and archives of the American Agriculture News,
the main limitation deals with the lack of primary sources. Most AAM members were middle!64

aged during the participation in the Tractorcade; Therefore, most participants are no longer alive
or are unable to share their experiences. Since the Kinsley Library oral histories were
documented in 2012, that database provides a copious amount of research which would not have
been possible to gather today.
Additionally, this thesis only documents personal experiences from farmers out of
Kansas, despite the fact that farmers traveled from all parts of the country, and certainly faced
different obstacles during their travels. There are a few reasons for this choice. Mainly, as
mentioned previously, many Tractorcade participants are difficult to get in contact with, no
longer alive, or unavailable to share their stories. Furthermore, the main focus of this thesis looks
at Tractorcade while in Washington, D.C. during the demonstration, where all participants were
gathered together, mostly experiencing the same events at the same time. This thesis also utilizes
a literature review on AAM and Tractorcade in order to take into account the broader experiences
felt by all of those who were a part of the social movement.
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Conclusion
Investigating the relationship between group theory and the American Agriculture
Movement provides a way to understand AAM’s attempt to use Tractorcade as a means to
promote police change. Additionally, using Charles Tilly’s worthiness, unity, numbers, and
commitment criteria to evaluate Tractorcade allows for a comprehensive assessment of the trials
and tribulations faced during the movement in the winter of 1979. The unwavering ability of
disconnected farmers from across the country to gather as one in face of adversity shows the
power of social movements to allow for common struggles and common goals to join individuals
together.
AAM was successful in gathering a myriad of participants, all eager to take political
matters into their own hands for the first time in their farming careers. Convoys from all corners
of the United States stuck together, traveling hundreds of miles to their final destination on
Capitol Hill. Their unity was obvious. The sight of their tractors in the middle of Washington,
D.C. strung them tightly together while “Farmer’s for 100% parity” was simultaneously
plastered on vehicles, hats, buttons, and voiced to policy makers. Their demands were clear and
consistently articulated to any legislator that would listen.
Although the movement was able to network, negotiate, and encourage change in
Washington D.C. for farmers, shortly after the popularity of the movement ended, the AAM’s
presence in policy making continued to decline over years following the 1979 Tractorcade. This
has lead to the almost complete desolation of AAM today. Despite the extraordinary measures
Tractorcade participants took that winter, the farmers’ commitment to the AAM as a whole
faltered as they realized their demands were unlikely to be followed through with legislation.
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Farmers ultimately returned home in order to carry out duties as usual on small farms across the
nation, hoping conditions would improve if they could keep their farms from going under.
Nevertheless, these farmers had a newfound understanding of the legislative process, which
equipped them with the tools they needed to make educated decisions regarding the welfare of
their farms and the livelihoods of their families and communities.
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A1
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A5.1
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A5.2
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A9

Page one of Beverly Snyder’s Tractorcade Diary, documenting her journey from January 18,
1979 through February 8, 1979.
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A10
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APPENDIX B
PHOTOS AND DOCUMENTS
Courtesy of Kinsley Library, Tractorcade to D.C. Exhibit

AAM members gathering during the Tractorcade in Washington, D.C. in February 1979
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Buttons

Made
Sold
Traded

By Judi McKinney
Not long after the AAM started lots
of slogans began to become popular.
Bev and Rocky Snyder wanted to be
involved so we decided to finance the
trips by making buttons. We could sell
them for $1.00, so we purchased 1000
and a machine to make them. The buttons cost us 25¢ to make, and we split
75¢. It soon became apparent that
everyone wanted a button to wear. My
kitchen table became our assembly
line. We could do 125 to 175 in an
hour depending on how many mistakes we made.
This bag belongs to
Dolores Jones.
Beneath the buttons
it says “My Ag Bag.”

Whenever one of us went on a tractorcade
or to a AAM meeting or W.I.F.E. meeting, we
took buttons. Rocky Snyder, Bob McKinney
and Rob McKinney made trips to Hutchinson,
Topeka, Great Bend, Larned, Greensburg, and
Kinsley on tractors or driving a service truck.
The buttons paid for the gas for the tractor and/
or service truck.

When it was time to go to Washington,
D.C., Bev wanted to go. We got busy and
made 500 buttons. She was going to give
some away and sell some. Little did we know
that the buttons would be such a big success. She called Rocky from the road and said, “I need
more buttons.” Rocky called me and said he‟d be up with the kids because we needed to make buttons. Thank goodness, I had ordered another 1000 buttons But how
were we going to get them to Bev? We found someone who was going
to meet up with the tractorcade in St. Louis, so I sent 1000.
When the tractors were on the Mall in Washington, D.C., Peggy
Arensman went several times. The first time she went, I sent 3000 buttons with her. When she went to get on the airplane, they searched her
bag. Some of the buttons weren‟t fastened on the back. Security made
her sit down and go through the bag and pin all that weren‟t fastened.
The next time we made sure they were all fastened before we sent them
with her.
B-J Buttons made 10,000 buttons during the American Ag Movement. They paid for Bev staying in D.C. and gas for tractors and trucks
on tractorcades. One of our buttons is in the Smithsonian Institute in
the AAM display.

Bill “Dub:Stapleton’s hat

“I took the bucket of buttons and sold 477. A lot of people
– all tense and anxious, many looking tired.”
Tractorcade diary of Beverly Snyder Anderson, February 3, 1979, Frederick, Maryland

“The UAW convention was in DC. We got to talking to those guys in the hotel, and they said, „We want someone to come down in the morning and address our group.‟ Bud Bitner went and told them what we were up to.
When he got done, the president of the UAW looked at Karen and said, “This lady has a lot of caps and a lot of
buttons that she is selling, and I want everybody in here not to leave until they are gone!”
Darrel Miller
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LEWIS STRIKE OFFICE FIGHTING FOR PARITY

Farmers could no longer make a living on the family farm.
They were heavily in debt with double digit interest, exports were suffering because of the economy,
energy costs were high, land prices were plummeting, and there was an ongoing drought.
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March 29, 1978 Bank meeting at the grade school in Albert, KS. Keith Sebelius was the speaker. “Lewis A.A.M. in full force attendance!”
1- Rocky Snyder 2- Darrel Miller 3- Mark Scheufler 4- Larry Matlack? 5- Jeff Mead 6- Jerry Stapleton 7- Lester Derley 8- Beverly Snyder
9- Jim Titus
10- Bob McKinney 1112- Don Bergner ? 13- Don McAllister ? 14.
15.
16- Dub Stapleton 17- Clara Stapleton 18- Judy McKinney 19- Karen Miller 20- Beverly Cornelison 2122. Zelma Mead
23- Jean Titus 24- Bill Nichols or Wilkerson? 15- Jack Wolfe 16- Dosca Wolfe 27- Tom Giessel 28- Banker from Albert, KS

For a brief time there were AAM strike offices in Kinsley and
Offerle, but when the Lewis office opened in January, 1979, it
became the hub for Edwards County farmers. It was located
in a small office in the Golden Manor Restaurant building on
Main Street with its entrance in the back on the west side. It
was open 6 days a week and was staffed with volunteers who
kept the coffer pot full, answered the phone, disseminated information, worked on fund raising, organized activities and
encouraged (or harassed) the politicians.
Edwards County farmers chartered a bus to attend
the Tractorcade in Topeka on December 10, 1977.
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“We just wanted to tell our story”

“How do we make you understand we are fighting for the life and land we love!”

ABOVE: Alvin Jenkins of Campo Colorado was one
of AAM’s four founders and leading activist.
BELOW: Senators Nancy Kassebaum and Bob Dole
Gerald McCathern, Texas farmer, rancher and AAM activist
who authored Gentle Rebel: The Story of the Farm Protest of
1977 thru 1982 and From the White House to the Hoosegow
Father Andy Gottschalk, Catholic
Priest from Schoenchen, KS and serving in Eastern Colorado was popular
speaker and AAM supporter.

Jerome Kimmel (Hereford, TX), Bud Bitner (Walsch, CO),
and Gene Schroeder (Campo. CO) testifying at hearing.
AAM testifying at a USDA hearing with Bob Bergland, the
Secretary of Agriculture on February 21, 1978 in Wichita.

US Congressment Keith Sebelius and Dan Glickman in hearings

Bill Wilkerson (Manter, KS) and others telling their stories
Unknown, Noralee Matousek, Gloria Crane, Peggy Arensman, Sheryl
Giessel, Nancy Spiegel, 3 unknown, and Mary Hodgkinson meeting with
Governor John Carlin to create a W.I.F.E Day.

Paul Chase (Bird City, KS), Bill Nicholas (Johnson, KS), Mildred VanNahman
(Kinsley), Congressman James Jeffries of the 2nd Congressional District, Karen
and Darrel Miller
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FARMERS CLASH WITH POLICE
Tractors tie-up traffic and farmers demonstrate in Capitol
February 5, 1979
19 farmers arrested — 17 tractors impounded

“The Missouri leader (Marvin

Oerke, Butler, MO) lowered his
blade and didn’t stop until he had
3 police cars and some cycles piled up.

By then the cops had broken his tractor window and dragged him out. Another driver had a mace can in his cab after he bumped some cycles. He is in the hospital in critical condition. Others were clubbed after harassing cops.”
Beverly Snyder Diary

“One thing that the D.C. police did
that was really funny was they tried
to scare the farmers with their
mounted police. These farmers aren’t
“Daryl Chenoweth (Haviland, KS) bumped a motorcycle cop who drove out right in front of him, then
slammed on the brakes. After about 15 minutes, drivers became impatient. Daryl was in the police car along with an officer.
Another officer, a lady, was doing the writing.”
Beverly Snyder

afraid of those horses. They know those
horses aren’t going to kick them. They might
push them around, but if you take a hotshot,
the horse will move. So, they put the horses
up real quick when the farmers got the hotshots out.”
Mary Ellen Schinstock

“When we got up that morning, they had men up on the Capitol with guns.
A LITTLE RURAL MISCHIEF AND FARMER HUMOR...

After they did
the parade, they had the tractors down there all barricaded in (with buses, trucks, and other city vehicles) so
they couldn’t get out.”
Jean Titus

...a threshing machine over the White House wall...

Don Bergner’s (Pratt) tractor was used for Mercy Missions

Police in full riot gear on all the Capitol steps and roof

“There was this huge 20”
snow and all a sudden we went
...burning a cotton bale or spare tractor or two...

… and keeping the police chasing Missouri goats.

from being the enemy to being
their friends because nobody
could do anything, and the farmers were hauling doctors and
nurses to hospitals with tractors.
They even took these big ones
with the blades out to the national
airport and had them cleaning off
runways. They were donating
blood and the farm women were
cooking meals in places. After
that the farmers redeemed themselves a little bit.” Darrel Miller Karen Miller and Deputy
Chief of Police Robert Klotz
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Ed & Marj Scheufler
with police

Farmers reseeded the
Mall in the spring

“When you get back there in Washington,
D.C., the Mall was operated by the Park Police.
Then you had the Capitol Hill Police. Then you had
the Washington, D.C. Metro. But we got to be friends
with a lot of those guys.”
Darrel Miller
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